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The Open Our Democracy Act:
A Proposal for Effective Election Reform
NIEL FRANZESE*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 31, 2014 Representative John Delaney, a Democrat from
Maryland, introduced H.R. 5334 to the House of Representatives.1 The title
of the bill was the “Open Our Democracy Act,”2 and he described it as
[a] bill to require all candidates for election for the office of
Member of the House of Representatives to run in a single
open primary regardless of political party preference, [and] to
limit the ensuing general election for such office to the two
candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in such
single open primary . . . .3
This bill represents the latest in a long line of calls for congressional
election reform from both Democrats4 and Republicans.5 The most recent
high-profile calls for election reform in the news have focused on
campaign finance reform,6 but Representative Delaney’s bill turns its
attention to three less-often discussed proposals. His three proposals are
first, implementing open primaries for House elections; second, making
*
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1
H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014).
2
Id. Throughout this Comment, H.R. 5334 will be referred to interchangeably as “the Open Our
Democracy Act,” “the bill,” and “the Act”.
3
H.R. 5334.
4
Ari Berman, Election Reform Should Be a Top Priority for the New Congress, NATION (Jan. 23,
2013),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/172385/election-reform-should-be-top-priority-new-congress
[http://perma.cc/6CZL-CM4D] (“On two major occasions—during his election-night speech and
second inaugural address—President Obama has highlighted the need for election reform.”).
5
Endorsers of Instant Runoff Voting, CTR. FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY,
http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/instant-runoff-voting/endorsers-of-instant-runoff-voting/#.Uba5_kcezl [http://perma.cc/Y7RY-TDV7] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (listing members of Congress from
both parties who support adopting Instant Runoff Voting systems, including Republican Senator John
McCain).
6
See Robert Kelner & Raymond la Raja, McCain-Feingold’s Devastating Legacy, WASH. POST
(Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mccain-feingolds-devastating-legacy/2014/
04/11/14a528e2-c18f-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html [http://perma.cc/S38N-EK7J] (discussing
calls for change after the Supreme Court’s decisions in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014), after the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act).
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Election Day a federal holiday; and third, beginning the process of
redistricting reform.7 In an op-ed for the Washington Post, Representative
Delaney highlighted the need for congressional election reform:
“Representative democracy is in crisis in the United States. One of the
three pillars of our system of government—the legislative branch—is
failing.”8 He cited problems with the current Congress, including the
federal government shutdown, minimal legislative activity, a struggling
middle class, and the unaddressed problem of aging infrastructure as
examples of the dysfunction in Congress.9 Sharing the frustrations of the
approximately 80% of Americans who disapprove of Congress,10 he wrote,
“we can’t let 535 people continue to limit the progress of a nation of more
than 300 million.”11 He was motivated to propose his package of election
reforms after considering the structural issues in the electoral process that
have “created perverse incentives that have warped our democracy and
empowered special interests and a vocal minority.”12 He cites this
dysfunction as the “logical result”13 of closed partisan primaries, a surplus
of gerrymandered districts that ensure the election of the same party year in
and year out, and low voter turnout.14
His first proposal—single open primaries in which all voters can
participate, regardless of party affiliation—is aimed at giving independent
and moderate voters a larger voice than they presently have.15 Under this
system, candidates for office are selected by all eligible voters, and the top
two vote-getters advance to the general election.16 Representative Delaney
says that high levels of dissatisfaction in the electorate should not be
surprising when candidates are selected using “a partisan primary filter”17
that creates low voter turnout and results in “an incentive to appeal only to
the most committed—and ideological—voters.”18 With open primaries, the
ability to win votes outside of a narrow, ideologically committed base
becomes more important, even in districts where the top two candidates are
likely to come from the same political party.19
The second proposal is simply aimed at making it easier to vote.20
7

John K. Delaney, How to Fix Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2014, at A15.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
19
Id.
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Id.
8
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Representative Delaney cited early poll closing times creating difficulty for
working parents “who have to commute from work to day care to home to
a polling place”21 as his primary motivation, but other issues, such as long
stretches of waiting in line to vote,22 could also be remedied by this
proposal.
The third proposal, redistricting reform, is intended to remedy the
problems that have resulted from partisan gerrymandering.23 Redistricting
for congressional elections occurs every ten years after the national census
is taken and congressional representation numbers are calculated, as
required by the Constitution.24 The States have varying methods of
redistricting,25 and, over the years, repeated redistricting has resulted in the
creation of districts that are stretched over odd boundaries in an attempt to
ensure that one party is guaranteed election by creating districts with
unbeatable majorities.26 These “one party enclaves”27 make it so that
Representatives’ “main concern is making the most rabid faction of their
parties happy.”28 “According to the Cook Political Report, only 16 percent
of House districts are competitive.”29 In Representative Delaney’s
experience, Representatives from these competitive districts have been
much more likely to work towards compromises on a bipartisan basis.30
Representatives from heavily gerrymandered districts do not feel the same
incentives to compromise since they do not have to act on behalf of their
entire district, but only on behalf of those who will guarantee their
reelection.31 The Open Our Democracy Act calls for the Comptroller
General,32 a member of the Government Accountability Office,33 to
“examine the feasibility of national standards for drawing district lines,”34
21

Id.
Phillip Bump, Planning to Vote? Here’s How Long You Could Wait, WASH. POST (Nov. 3,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/11/03/planning-to-vote-tomorrow-itshould-take-15-minutes/ [http://perma.cc/QVV8-ABQQ].
23
Delaney, supra note 7.
24
Congressional Redistricting, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/
redistricting.htm [http://perma.cc/S2QE-C5QS] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
25
Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(June 25, 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.aspx
[http://perma.cc/3PJC-A6KD].
26
Christopher Ingraham, What 60 Years of Political Gerrymandering Looks Like, WASH. POST
(May 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/05/21/what-60-years-ofpolitical-gerrymandering-looks-like/ [http://perma.cc/9KYG-THNM].
27
Delaney, supra note 7.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014).
33
Delaney, supra note 7.
34
Id.
22
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an important first step to determine the best direction for redistricting
reform to take. “Let’s examine what works—a number of states provide
good examples—and develop a framework,”35 Representative Delaney
urges.
The most convincing point made by Representative Delaney in his
Washington Post piece was his call to action. “We need to act. Low voter
turnout, gerrymandering and non-competitive elections are creating a
frightening negative feedback loop. As mainstream voters grow
increasingly disgusted and apathetic, only extreme partisans stay
interested, creating more race-to-the-base contests, which then turn off
more moderates and on and on.”36
This Comment examines the current state of the problems that each of
these three reforms seeks to address and how the Act seeks to solve the
problem. Ultimately, it argues that the three reforms in concert would have
a greater effect than each would alone. Part II discusses single open
primaries for congressional elections. Part III considers Election Day as a
federal holiday, and Part IV discusses congressional redistricting reform.
Finally, Part V discusses the Open Our Democracy Act as a coherent
package of reforms and argues in support of Representative Delaney’s
statement that “[e]ach of the reforms in the Open Our Democracy Act,
individually, would help counteract the dysfunction that has broken
Congress. Taken together, they can do more than that”37 with the end goal
of “mak[ing] the House of Representatives actually representative.”38
II. SINGLE OPEN PRIMARIES FOR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Section 2 of the Act is titled “Election of Members of House of
Representatives Through Open Primaries.”39 It calls for a single open
primary election for each office, followed by a single general election for
each office.40 The open primary is to be conducted such that “each
candidate for such office, regardless of the candidate’s political party
preference, shall appear on a single ballot”41 and “each voter in the State
who is eligible to vote in elections for Federal office in the Congressional
district involved may cast a ballot in the election, regardless of the voter’s
political party preference.”42 In the subsequent general election, only the
“[two] candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in the single open
35

Id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
36
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primary election[,] . . . without regard to the political party preference of
such candidates[,]”43 would appear on the ballot.44
Under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, the
ultimate power to regulate the times, places, and manner of holding
elections for Representatives is reserved to Congress.45 The first part of
that Clause assigns the power to the States and their respective legislatures,
but the second part states that “the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic]
Senators,”46 thus explicitly granting Congress authority to modify existing
systems for electing Representatives.47
A. This Proposed Reform Aims to Remove the Incentives to Increase
Political Polarization that Are Associated with Current Primary
Systems
Political parties have been around for almost as long as the country has
been in existence,48 but states did not begin to create legislation providing
for primary elections by political parties in order to select candidates for
the general election until the 1890s.49 “By 1910, 22 states had enacted laws
establishing direct primary systems, and by 1916, primaries were being
conducted in 26 states.”50
1. In Theory, Currently Existing Closed and Semi-Closed Primaries
Incentivize Candidates to Appeal to the Most Extreme Components
of Their Parties
Four general types of primary elections developed in the United States
via the experimentation of individual states.51 These are the closed
primary, the semi-closed primary, the open primary, and the blanket
primary.52 “Primaries exist on a spectrum from closed to open, with the
blanket primary being the purest form of an open primary.”53
In the closed primary election system, only party members
(who are otherwise eligible to vote) are permitted to vote in a
43

Id.
Id.
45
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
46
Id.
47
160 CONG. REC. H7186 (daily ed. July 31, 2014) (statement of Rep. Delaney).
48
Robin Miller, Annotation, Constitutionality of Candidate Participation Provisions for Primary
Elections, 121 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2013).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Chenwei Zhang, Towards a More Perfect Election: Improving the Top-Two Primary for
Congressional and State Races, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 620 (2012).
44
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party’s primary election. In the semi-closed primary system,
unaffiliated voters (independents) otherwise eligible to vote
are permitted to vote in a party’s primary election if the party
chooses to permit their voting. Otherwise, as in the closed
primary, only party members are permitted to vote. In the
open primary system, all persons eligible to vote may,
regardless of party affiliation, choose the party in whose
primary they will vote, although voters are restricted to
participating in one party’s primary. The blanket primary
system, in its partisan version, takes this vision farther and
permits each voter to vote in a different party’s primary for
each office.54
Closed and semi-closed primaries have the benefit of promoting “party
unity and prevent[ing] nonmembers from ‘raiding’ a party’s election,
which occurs when a voter votes for the perceived weakest candidate from
the opposing party in an attempt to pit that candidate against his or her
preferred candidate.”55 However, these primaries sacrifice the full
participation of voters in a district in order to limit raiding. In the current
two-party system, sacrificing the participation of voters outside of the party
means that a candidate’s best bet in a closed primary is to appeal to his
party’s most active and loyal voters, who are often the most ideologically
polarized.56
Open primaries make primaries “conducive to voter participation by
more openly welcoming voters who are independent or not decidedly
partisan,”57 but “may encourage political raiding, which is what the closed
primary is designed to prevent.”58 In blanket primaries “[a]ll candidates
from all political parties appear on a single ballot, and the most popular
candidate from each party becomes the party’s nominee.”59 Traditional
blanket primaries preserve partisan divisions by having the most popular
candidate from each party become that party’s nominee; the subsequent
general election will still have one Republican running against one
54

Miller, supra note 48.
Zhang, supra note 53.
56
See Section 1: Growing Ideological Consistency, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.peoplepress.org/2014/06/12/section-1-growing-ideological-consistency [http://perma.cc/X9SQ-LQGE] (last
visited Oct. 26, 2015) (combining data from five Pew Research Center surveys to demonstrate in an
infographic that “as ideological consistency has become more common, it has become increasingly
aligned with partisanship”); Section 5: Political Engagement and Activism, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-5-political-engagement-and-activism/ [http://perma.cc
/TE65-DALN] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (concluding based on the same data that the most polarized
voters are the most politically active in primaries).
57
Zhang, supra note 53, at 621.
58
Id.
59
Id.
55
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Democrat, even if those two candidates were not truly the two most
popular.
2.

A Single Open Primary Will Incentivize Candidates to Appeal to
the Center

The system proposed by Representative Delaney differs slightly from
these four general categories. Generally, in an open primary, each eligible
voter chooses which party’s primary he or she will vote in.60 This
description assumes that each political party is still conducting a separate
primary to choose its own candidate to be presented in the general election.
In Representative Delaney’s formulation, there is a “single open
primary,”61 meaning that all candidates are included together in one
primary, regardless of party, and all voters participate in that single
primary election to choose candidates to move on to the general election.
This system has also been described as a “top-two primary,”62 a
“nonpartisan blanket primary,”63 and a “Jungle Primary.”64 The unifying
theme is that these “primaries are . . . multipartisan: the top two vote
getters, regardless of party affiliation, face off against each other in the
general election.”65 This system is derived from the blanket primary,66 but
“departs from the blanket primary because the top two vote-getters go on
to the general election, regardless of political party.”67 This system
converts the purpose of the primary election from selecting the nominee
for each party into “winnow[ing] the list of candidates for the general
election.”68
Representative Delaney is not alone in thinking these systems may
“actually create[] an electoral system that favors centrists rather than
politicians who play to their party’s base;”69 Senator Chuck Schumer wrote
a July 2014 op-ed in the New York Times stating his case for “a national
movement to adopt the ‘top-two’ primary (also known as an open
primary), in which all voters, regardless of party registration, can vote and
the top two vote-getters, regardless of party, then enter a runoff.”70 This
system “essentially converts a traditional primary into a general election,
60

Miller, supra note 48.
H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (emphasis added).
62
Joe Klein, California’s New Jungle Primary System, TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/
100556/the-jungle-primary/ [http://perma.cc/DNX8-335H].
63
Miller, supra note 48.
64
Klein, supra note 62.
65
Id.
66
Zhang, supra note 53, at 621.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 622.
69
Klein, supra note 62.
70
Charles E. Schumer, End Partisan Primaries, Save America, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2014, at A0.
61
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and a traditional general election into a runoff election.”

B. Empirical Studies on the Limited Data Available Have Found Little if
Any Effect of the Openness of Primary Elections on the Extremity of
the Politicians They Produce
Despite the intuitive appeal of the theory that open primaries will have
a moderating effect on the candidates that are ultimately elected, analysis
of available data on legislators’ ideological positions and the primary
systems that elected them has failed to show this relationship, and in some
cases has even shown that more open primaries elect legislators who are
more extreme.72 A study led by Eric McGhee at the Public Policy Institute
of California looked at data from most states for the years from 1992 to
2010 to test for a “selection effect”—that is, whether or not different
primary systems encourage more moderate legislators to run and whether
they help the ones who do run win more often.73 This “selection effect” is
contrasted to a “conversion effect,” which is a measure of whether or not
incumbent legislators change their issue positions to reflect the changing
incentive structure of a new primary system.74 Studies on the conversion
effect have found that “incumbents rarely change their minds [in these
situations], and when they do, that change is limited.”75 As for the selection
effect, McGhee found that levels of polarization were mostly constant for
both major parties across different types of primary election systems.76
However, McGhee concluded that the study’s “findings generally fail to
reject the null hypothesis of no effect from primary systems.”77 Notably,
this study was constrained by the limitation that not all states had adopted
different primary systems in the time frame analyzed.78 However, McGhee
noted that some studies had found an effect of nomination systems on
polarization in the state of California,79 one of the few states that had
implemented an open primary similar to the one contemplated by the Act,
before concluding that “analysis shows that concluding much from this
relationship would be premature.”80
71

Zhang, supra note 53, at 617.
Eric McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator
Ideology, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 337, 337–38 (2014).
73
Id. at 341.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 343.
77
Id. at 347.
78
Id. at 334. The information in these graphs is limited because it does not account for relevant
variation between states. Some states have changed their primary systems, and others are not present in
early or late years of the data set, so the precise group of states in each category is not constant.
79
Id. at 349 (“Indeed, California is virtually the only state where a change in primary system has
produced the expected moderating effect.”).
80
Id.
72
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A different study by Shideo Hirano at Columbia University found little
to no evidence that the threat of primary competition, like the threat that
would be present to incumbents in open primaries, had any effect on
congressional partisan polarization.81 Hirano’s study was focused on
testing whether or not any type of primary produces partisan polarization
in the Representatives that it elects.82 At the outset Hirano noted that
“[a]lthough the conventional wisdom suggests that the introduction of
primary elections will have a polarizing effect on the positions of members
of Congress, there are surprisingly few empirical studies that test this idea
directly.”83 Hirano went on to test this idea, and found that “even when the
ideological composition of the primary electorate appears to be relatively
extreme [as theoretically is the case in a closed primary] or when the threat
of primary competition appears to be particularly strong [as would be the
case in an open primary],”84 “various empirical investigations suggest that
primary elections do not have a large impact on [Representatives’] roll call
voting positions.”85
Another study by Douglas Ahler at the University of California,
Berkeley focused on California’s 2012 primaries, noting that they were the
first to be conducted under a new top-two format.86 In his paper, Ahler
cited studies concluding that open primaries do moderate political
outcomes, as well as others finding that open primaries failed to moderate
politicians.87 However, upon conducting his own study, Ahler found that
voters failed to distinguish between moderate and extreme candidates
under the new primary system.88 Ahler attributed this to the fact that voters
appeared to know so little about candidates’ positions that they could not
have intentionally cast ballots for more moderate candidates even if they
had wanted to.89

81
Shigeo Hirano et al., Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 5 Q.J.
POL. SCI. 169, 169 (2010).
82
Id. at 170.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 172.
85
Id.
86
DOUGLAS AHLER ET AL., DO OPEN PRIMARIES IMPROVE REPRESENTATION? 1,
https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~glenz/openprimary/openprimary.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UK8V-4VAB]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
87
Id. at 3.
88
Id. at 1.
89
Id. at 4.
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C. Despite a Lack of Current Empirical Support for the Proposition that
Open Primaries Will Moderate the Political Views of Elected
Representatives, Single Open Primaries Are Still Best Suited for
Congressional Elections
As detailed above in Part II.B, empirical studies have been unable to
confirm or deny whether open primaries have the moderating effects on
candidates that they are theorized to have. While this presents a formidable
obstacle for backers of open primaries, as will be discussed below in Part
D, it does not mean that a switch to open primaries would not have
beneficial effects on the election process. Even without empirically
documented proof of moderated political outcomes, ideological support for
the moderating effects of open primaries remains strong. With voter
participation in elections ranging from about 60% in presidential election
years to 40% in midterm election years,90 widespread ideological support
for open primaries could increase voter participation by decreasing feelings
of apathy toward the political process. The prospect of election reform
through the adoption of open primaries, coupled with academic theoretical
support for the moderating effects of open primaries, could reduce this
apathy. Such a situation might motivate voters to participate in primaries
that they had not in the past in hopes of taking advantage of a renewed
chance to have their voices heard in a new type of primary election. It is
quite possible that open primaries have not been adopted in enough
jurisdictions to allow the types of studies detailed above to provide a clear
picture of their results in practice on a national scale, as is proposed by the
Act. Whether or not this possibility is a statistical truth is likely to be
unimportant to an average voter during the advent of widespread open
primary systems; a lack of conclusive studies with findings undermining
the open primary system is reason enough to give the proposed new system
a chance.
The fact remains that politics in the United States remains more
polarized than ever before.91 This is the result of many factors, and despite
the lack of empirical support, one of the prevailing theories as to a
contributing cause continues to be the idea that in closed primaries,
candidates are incentivized to appeal to their most extreme constituents.92
Commentators observe that when politics are polarized to this extent, both
unified and divided forms of government are likely to tend to extreme
forms of themselves.93 When the government is divided, that is, when
90
Mark N. Franklin, Electoral Participation, in CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR 83
(Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Wiesberg eds., 2010).
91
See sources cited supra note 56 (providing findings on polarization in American politics today).
92
Zhang, supra note 53, at 631.
93
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy
in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 325 (2011).
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different parties control either the House, Senate, or Presidency, in a
polarized political environment it tends to produce politics of
“confrontation, indecision, and deadlock.”94 “To the extent anything gets
done, diluted, discrete compromises may tend to replace ideologically
coherent, large initiatives.”95 When the government is unified during
highly polarized times, there is an increased risk that the system of checks
and balances will break down; “a Congress controlled by the same party as
the president is unlikely to be aggressive in overseeing the executive
branch’s actions, exposing failings in the president’s administration, or
holding the president accountable.”96 There is also the risk that “with the
minority party removing itself from the legislative process and, in essence,
simply opposing all legislative initiatives of the majority, there will be less
checking and balancing within the legislative process.”97
Richard Pildes has suggested that “[t]he single institutional change
most likely to lead to some moderation of candidates and officeholders,
across all elections, would be to change the design of primary elections.”98
About half of all states use closed or semi-closed primaries.99 “The most
ideologically committed and hardcore party activists tend to dominate
closed primaries even more than they already dominate primaries in
general”100 and, as a result, “closed primary winners are thought more
likely to reflect the ideological extremes around which the median party
activist centers.”101
Primaries of the type proposed in the Act theoretically have the
potential to decrease polarization by encouraging candidates to appeal to
the center, shaping the policies enacted by those congressmen once elected.
“The top-two primary is designed to increase the chances of election for
moderates running for Congress or the state legislature, particularly in
election districts that are overwhelmingly dominated by voters affiliated
with one party.”102 The continued academic acceptance of the idea that
open primaries carry with them the possibility of a moderating effect on
politicians outweighs the mixed findings of some studies indicating this
effect would not be realized, and supports the position in the Act that
single open primaries should be given a chance on a national scale. If
single open primaries turn out to be ineffective or have unforeseen
consequences, primary systems could always revert to what they are
94

Id. at 326 (citation omitted).
Id.
96
Id. at 327.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 299.
100
Id.
101
Id. (emphasis omitted).
102
Id. at 302 (citation omitted).
95
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presently through appropriate legislation without any harm done.
D. Election Reform in the Form of Single Open Primaries Is Likely to Be
Challenged by the Political Parties Themselves, but Will Survive These
Challenges
1. There Are Preexisting Criticisms of Open Primary Systems
Single open primaries like the one proposed in the Act are not without
their criticisms.
Proponents of more open primaries claim that they help
produce more moderate candidates, more accurately reflect
the median voter’s preferences, and encourage more citizen
participation. Opponents claim that they take away from
political parties’ freedom of association, impose more
difficulties for minor party candidates to win elections, and
that they in fact limit choice.103
California, Louisiana, and Washington have used some form of the
top-two primary system,104 and “widespread litigation against the top-two
primary is continuously budding.”105 Some of this litigation has made it to
the U.S. Supreme Court and “a rather inconsistent and incoherent
jurisprudence regarding the law of primaries (which partially stems from
its legal uncertainty in defining political parties)”106 has developed.
Many of the challenges have been based on issues of forced
association when parties are not free to exclude participants or control selfdesignated labels of candidates.107 The Court has “generally been
deferential to political parties’ First Amendment rights to freedom of
association,”108 declining to force parties to affiliate with candidates that
they reject,109 and allowing parties to exclude voters from their
primaries.110 “On the other hand, there is a competing recognition of
stronger state regulatory interests that protect ‘the overall integrity of the
historic electoral process.’”111 Blanket primaries similar to the system
suggested by Representative Delaney have been struck down where the top
candidates became the official nominees of their respective parties,112 but
103

Zhang, supra note 53, at 622.
Schumer, supra note 70; Zhang, supra note 53, at 624.
105
Zhang, supra note 53, at 618.
106
Id. at 622.
107
Id. at 622–23.
108
Id. at 622.
109
Id. at 622–24.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 623.
112
Id. at 622–24.
104
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“nonpartisan” blanket primaries where the top-two candidates advanced
regardless of political party have been upheld. The rationale behind this
distinction is that when the two candidates who move on are not “official”
nominees, the impact on associational rights is lessened.113
Section 3 of the Act, “Ability of Candidates to Disclose Political Party
Preferences,” provides:
(a) OPTION OF CANDIDATES TO DECLARE POLITICAL PARTY
PREFERENCE.—At the time a candidate for the office of
Member of the House of Representatives files to run for such
office, the candidate shall have the option of declaring a
political party preference, and the preference chosen (if any)
shall accompany the candidate’s name on the ballot for the
election for such office.
(b) DESIGNATION FOR CANDIDATES NOT DECLARING
PREFERENCE.—If a candidate does not declare a political
party preference under subsection (a), the designation “No
Party Preference” shall accompany the candidate’s name on
the ballot for the election for such office.
(c) NO PARTY ENDORSEMENT IMPLIED.—The selection of a
party preference by a candidate under subsection (a) shall not
constitute or imply endorsement of the candidate by the party
designated, and no candidate in a general election shall be
deemed the official candidate of any party by virtue of his or
her selection in the primary.114
This section alleviates concerns about forced association in violation of
the First Amendment, and gives the single open primary the air of
nonpartisanship that the Supreme Court has indicated it requires.115 Section
4 of the Act, “Protection of Rights of Political Parties” further emphasizes
this point by explicitly stating that
[n]othing in this Act shall restrict the right of individuals to
join or organize into political parties or in any way restrict
the right of private association of political parties. Nothing in
this Act shall restrict a party’s right to contribute to, endorse,
113
Id. at 624. In Washington State Grange v. Washington Republican Party, 522 U.S. 442,
458–59 (2008), the Court rejected a challenge to Washington’s newly established blanket primary
system as facially violative of political parties’ associational rights because the candidate’s selfidentified parties were not forced upon the official parties. Louisiana’s version of the top-two primary
was reinstated in 2010, and parties in the State declined to challenge it because it appeared to fit within
the nonpartisan nature required by the Court in Washington State Grange. Zhang, supra note 53, at
617–18, 621–24.
114
H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014).
115
See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text (detailing the law of primaries that has been
developed by the Supreme Court, including that single primaries must be nonpartisan).
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or otherwise support a candidate for the office of Member of
the House of Representatives.116
To assuage the fears of the parties themselves, the language of the Act
allows parties to “establish such procedures as it sees fit to endorse or
support candidates or otherwise participate in all elections,”117 and to
“informally designate candidates for election to such an office at a party
convention or by whatever lawful mechanism the party may choose, other
than pursuant to a primary election held by a State.”118 Further, the Act
allows a political party to “adopt such rules as it sees fit for the selection of
party officials (including central committee members, presidential electors,
and party officers), including rules restricting participation in elections for
party officials to those who disclose a preference for that party at the time
of registering to vote.”119 With these two sections, Representative Delaney
made it clear that the single open primary scheme set out in the Act would
be nonpartisan and not implicate the concerns of infringing on First
Amendment associational rights for which other primary schemes have
previously been struck down.
The Supreme Court has held that all election laws invariably impose
some type of burden on individual voters.120 Some such laws are subject to
strict scrutiny, but in general a more flexible standard in the form of a
balancing test applies.121 “A court considering a challenge to a state
election law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into
consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff's rights.’”122
Because the Supreme Court has previously applied strict scrutiny in
cases dealing with statutory burdens of the associational rights of political
parties relating to primary elections,123 any challenge to this portion of the
Act is likely to allege that an impermissible burden on First Amendment
associational rights has been imposed by forcing all parties to compete in a
single open primary in order to get strict scrutiny review. Indeed, this is the
form that some of the challenges to open primaries in California124 and
116
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Washington have taken.
To defeat these types of challenges, defenders of the Act would have to
demonstrate that the portion mandating single open primaries is a narrowly
tailored regulation that advances compelling government interests.126 Proof
that this provision of the Act is narrowly tailored comes from Sections 3
and 4, as discussed earlier in this Part. Concerns about burdens on the right
of association caused by misidentification by voters of the parties that
candidates belong to, as were put forth in Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Connecticut,127 are addressed in Section 3(c)’s assurances that just because
a candidate identifies with a party, official support is not to be implied.128
Concerns about burdens imposed on the First Amendment right to
expression by choosing a candidate are addressed in Section 4, as it
explains that the Act does not interfere with parties’ own internal selection
and nomination processes.
As explained in Part II.C above, a compelling governmental interest
supporting the Act is to reduce polarization and increase the functionality
of Congress. As shown above in Part II.B, it will be difficult for defenders
of the Act to find empirical support for the proposition that a single open
primary will moderate Representatives that are ultimately elected, but they
can point to the limitations of studies conducted to date in order to attempt
to write them off as inconclusive. Importantly, while these studies do not
directly support the moderating effects of open primaries, it can be argued
that they are too narrow and not conclusive enough to disprove the theory.
Once that argument is addressed, the defenders of the Act can focus, and
primarily rely on, policy and theoretical justifications to support their
position. These theoretical justifications are supported by academic writing
on the subject in the form of articles like those cited above demonstrating
first that Congress is dysfunctional in its current state, and second, that, at
least in theory, single open primaries could have a moderating effect on
which candidates are elected and cause Congress to function more
cooperatively and productively. In light of the minimal burdens imposed
on the associational rights of political parties, kept to a minimum by the
Act itself; the strong theoretical support for the moderating effects of open
primaries; and the highly compelling governmental interest in protecting
the integrity—and perceived integrity—of the electoral process, this
provision of the Act has a fighting chance to survive strict scrutiny. If
proponents of the Act are lucky in court, their burden will not be nearly as
high; when an election law provision imposes only reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment
125
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rights of voters, the government’s important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.129
III. ELECTION DAY AS A FEDERAL HOLIDAY
Section 5 of the Act is called “Treatment of Election Day in the Same
Manner as Legal Public Holiday for Purposes of Federal Employment.” It
is one of the shorter sections of the Act, and states that for the purposes of
federal employment, Election Day should be treated as a legal public
holiday as described in 5 U.S.C. § 6103.130 It also calls for a Sense of
Congress Resolution to be passed regarding treatment of Election Day by
private employers, stating: “It is the sense of Congress that private
employers in the United States should give their employees a day off on
the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November in 2016 and each
even-numbered year thereafter to enable the employees to cast votes in the
elections held on that day.”131 Congress has the power to regulate the times
that congressional elections are held pursuant to Article I, Section 4, of the
Constitution, and to make laws under the “necessary and proper” clause of
Article I, Section 8.132 All that is needed under § 6103 for Congress to
create a holiday is that it pass a statute doing so.133
A. Past Treatment of Election Day
Though the number of people eligible to vote in U.S. elections has
increased since 1789, “throughout American history the number of people
who exercise the right to vote has dramatically declined in proportion to
the number of people that have the right to vote.”134 In the earliest years of
American history, there were a variety of social forces that compelled
eligible voters to cast their votes on Election Day.135 Elections for
representatives to colonial assemblies were usually treated as major
celebrations; people had to travel considerable distances to cast their votes,
and once there, congregated in groups to catch up and converse with one
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See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“[W]hen a state election law provision
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another. These events were so popular that even large numbers of
Americans ineligible to vote attended for the festivities.137 “Elections were
lively public events, in which ‘amid the continuous electioneering and
political arguments, picnics, drinking, and boisterous celebration went on
throughout each polling day.’”138 Making attendance even more enticing,
the events usually ended with celebration feasts.139 During the 1800’s,
political parties took on the responsibility of “organizing festivities for
election day.”140 This festive atmosphere continued through the nineteenth
century, and was at its height for elections involving larger-than-life
figures like Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln.141
B. Modern Changes
One of the first changes marking the shift from treating Election Day
as a public celebration to the “private experience it is today”142 was the
transition to written ballots. Before then, “‘voting was … an oral and
public act: Men assembled before election judges, waited for their names
to be called, and then announced which candidates they supported.’”143 By
1850 “almost all states had changed over to written ballots.”144 However,
the early process of casting written ballots remained essentially a public
act.145 Political parties were responsible for distributing paper ballots with
the names of their candidates on them, and these ballots were
distinguishable from one another even when folded for submission.146
Within the polling place, voters simply placed their ballots into boxes or
handed them to election officials in front of others.147 Further, ballots being
marked or printed on distinctive paper ensured that there was no secrecy as
to how a person had voted.148
In the mid-1800’s and earlier, political parties functioned as organizers
of elections. They
established permanent premises at locations where “the
faithful gathered to talk politics, drink cider, organize parades
136
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and rallies, and read campaign literature.” In election years,
these meetings often took place on a weekly basis as party
loyalists solicited new members and prepared for festivities
by procuring torchlights, uniforms, and fireworks for
parades. Political parties also distributed honorific titles and
positions—President, Vice President, doorkeeper—to their
members, providing incentives to serve the party as well as a
sense of solidarity. Most importantly, they mobilized the
electorate to come out on election days.149
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, a significant increase in
government control over political parties and elections themselves brought
about “the end of election days as boisterous public holidays.”150 States and
municipalities “cracked down on political parties that had, by this time,
become notoriously corrupt, particularly in urban areas.”151
Also around this time, in 1845, Congress chose a uniform date for
presidential elections. The day for choosing presidential electors was
initially set as “the first Tuesday in November,”152 in years divisible by
four.153 Subsequently, it was pointed out that, in some years, the period
between the first Tuesday in November and the first Wednesday in
December, when the electors are required to meet in their state capitals to
vote, would be more than thirty-four days, in violation of the existing
Electoral College law.154 To remedy this problem, the date for choosing
presidential electors was moved to the Tuesday after the first Monday in
November, codifying Tuesday elections.155
Procedural changes were further exacerbated by dramatic social
changes like “the transformed ideal of citizenship embodied by the
educated individual voter, the emergence of the expert-run administrative
state as a new locus of policy decision making, the rise of interest groups
as a means to influence government, [] the breakdown of the gendered
construction of citizenship as male,”156 and the enfranchisement of African
American voters.157 Official ballots, adopted in part to promote
transparency and accountability, and in part to act as literacy tests to
disenfranchise minority groups,158 worked to increase the air of formality
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159

and secrecy surrounding elections. All of these changes throughout the
nineteenth century contributed to the transition from Election Day being
treated as a national celebration to it being the not particularly exciting
event that it has become in modern times.
C. Benefits of Election Day as a Federal Holiday
Other industrialized democracies, specifically Finland and Sweden,
have had success in moving their election days to holidays or weekends.160
In the United States, only fifteen states, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, make
Election Day a state holiday.161 The holiday means different things in
different states: “[i]n most of these states, state employees do not work and
most government offices are closed; only some states close schools.”162 A
national holiday is needed for congressional elections “because this is the
only way to ensure that private sector employees get off from work.”163
“Without doubt, one of the biggest turnout drains among those who
are already registered stems from the simple logistical fact that a good
number of people cannot take the time off from a normal working day to
vote.”164 When the voters that are able to make time to vote after they get
out of work show up to the polling place, long lines serve as a deterrent.165
“[V]oting lines are usually busiest after the evening commute.”166 Political
activist groups such as “Why Tuesday?”167 have picked up on these
statistics, advocating weekend voting, and noting that
U.S. Census data has long indicated the #1 reason voters
gave for not making it out to the polls was “too busy/couldn’t
get time off to vote.” In 2010, 27% of nonvoters gave this
answer. After the 2014 midterm elections, a staggering 69%
of nonvoters didn’t cast a ballot because they were stuck at
school or work, or were too busy, out of town, sick or forgot,
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168

according to Pew.

Surprisingly, almost no studies exist that compare voter turnout rates in
states or countries where Election Day has been moved to a holiday or
weekend to the turnout rates existing before the switch. However, there is
evidence that states and countries with Election Day treated as a holiday or
falling on a weekend have higher voter turnout rates than the United States
currently does on a national level.169 Thus, moving Election Day to a
weekend or treating it as a holiday does have an association with increased
voter turnout, but correlation has not been proven. Even without strong
correlative proof, it makes sense in light of the fact that lines at polling
stations appear longest before and after work170 that removing the workday
from the equation would allow more voters to access the polls at a steady
pace throughout the course of Election Day. It is possible that potential
voters would take an Election Day holiday to relax or go on vacation, and
still not vote, but that is a slight risk compared to the potentially significant
benefit to American democracy of increasing continually diminishing voter
turnout.
One of the simplest ways to solve the problem of low voter turnout and
to return to having voting on Election Day become a priority for voters as
it was at prior times in American history is to make the day something to
look forward to. It is unlikely that there would be a challenge to this
provision of the Act in the courts, so all that would be needed to enact this
reform would simply be to pass it in Congress. Making Election Day a
federal holiday as the Act suggests would greatly reduce the cost of voting
to individual voters, incentivize voters to go the polls by freeing up
dedicated time for the task, and renew interest and participation in
elections.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING REFORM
Finally, Section 6 of the Act calls for “a study of the feasibility and
desirability of enacting national standards and criteria for Congressional
redistricting” to be carried out by the Comptroller General and reported to
168
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Congress within a year of the passage of the Act. As a proposal not
directly related to the conduct of elections, Congress has the authority for
this section under Article I, Section 8.172
A. Redistricting and Gerrymandering
Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution delegates the authority for
drawing congressional districts from which Representatives are elected to
the States.173 “[W]hile the clause gives Congress the power to supersede
state regulations of congressional elections, Congress has not used this
power to divest states of redistricting authority.”174 Partisan
gerrymandering “is the method of creating electoral districts that provide
the greatest electoral benefit to the political party drawing the
boundaries”175 and occurs when a political party in control of the state
legislature or state redistricting process draws the lines in such a way that
one party is guaranteed to win based on the traditional voting preferences
of the voters included within the district.176
Two techniques, “packing” and “cracking,” are used to accomplish
gerrymandering.177 Packing “occurs when the boundaries of an electoral
district are changed in order to create an area that incorporates a majority
of people who vote in a similar way.”178 It creates a few districts with huge
majorities of like-minded voters, “making it easier for the party in power to
win or maintain control in the majority of the other districts.”179 Cracking
occurs “when an area with a high concentration of similar voters is split
among several districts, ensuring that these voters have a small minority in
several districts rather than a large majority in one, thereby diluting the
voting power of the group.”180 In either method, the outcome “is to draw
boundaries in such a way that the groups opposing the new boundaries are
concentrated so as to minimize their representation and influence.”181
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B. Problems Arising from Partisan Gerrymandering
“Gerrymandering is the method of creating electoral districts that
provide the greatest electoral benefit to the political party drawing the
boundaries.”182 There are several harms that can result to legislatures from
partisan gerrymandering, and all share the common criticism of increasing
“the ability of the minority to dilute the will of the majority.”183 The
practice of redrawing electoral districts in order to gain a political benefit
for one party has a long history, but recently it has become more
extreme.184 “For example, in the 2002 Congressional elections, 356 out of
the 435 House of Representatives members’ districts were decided by
margins of more than twenty percent and only four incumbents who faced
non-incumbent challengers were defeated.”185 Further, “[t]he 2004 election
of the House of Representatives was the fourth consecutive election in
which the incumbent success rate was at least ninety-eight percent.”186
One such harm is referred to as partisan bias.187 “Theories of partisan
bias condemn districting arrangements that make it easier for one party
than the other to convert votes cast in its favor on Election Day into
legislative seats.”188 In this instance, the harm takes place
when one party can capture a greater share of seats in the
legislature than the other party for a given level of electoral
support. For example, if Democrats garner 53 percent of the
vote and thereby capture 60 percent of the seats in the
legislature, then in an unbiased system the Republicans will
also capture 60 percent of the legislative seats if they garner
53 percent of the vote. If the Republicans were to capture a
greater seat share in this situation—say 70 percent—the
system would contain partisan bias in favor of the
Republicans.189
Another potential harm is the reduction of electoral competition.190
Proponents of this theory argue “that partisan gerrymandering is harmful
where it leads to a constriction of the competitive processes by which
voters can express choice.”191 A third potential harm is that partisan
gerrymandering creates increased polarization in the legislature by
182

Id. at 1277.
Id.
184
Id. at 1280–83.
185
Id. at 1273.
186
Id. at 1281.
187
Cox, supra note 173, at 419.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 422.
191
Id. at 423 (citation omitted).
183

2015]

A PROPOSAL FOR EFFECTIVE ELECTION REFORM

287

removing the incentive to appeal to centrists in elections, and making it so
that candidates need to appeal to only the most dedicated members of a
party’s base.192 What each of these problems has in common is that they
reduce the faith of voters in the representative character of government,
thereby disincentivizing them from voting in the first place because they
feel like their votes do not influence the outcome of elections in a
meaningful way.
C. Legislative Action Is Needed
Judicial remedies for the harms of partisan gerrymandering have been
largely ineffective, and so legislative action is needed. Court challenges to
districting drawing have often been regarded as non-justiciable political
questions, and “[o]nly in the last forty years has the judiciary entered the
political thicket of apportionment.”193 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
“has largely avoided the apportionment-related issue of partisan
gerrymandering.”194 The first time that the Court made a significant
contribution to this area was in Baker v. Carr.195 In that case, the Court
developed a six factor structure for analyzing political question issues,
found apportionment to be a justiciable non-political question, and adopted
the “one person, one vote” standard “requiring legislatures to create
districts with equal populations.”196 This “began the so-called
apportionment revolution, in which redistricting became primarily driven
by legal decisions.”197 These doctrines continued to develop in relation to
redistricting with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and several racial
gerrymandering cases.198 Even with this standard in effect, courts still had
difficulty addressing the qualitative issues of fair and effective
representation.199 In cases dealing with this issue, such as Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,200 the Supreme Court used the Fifteenth Amendment, rather than
the Fourteenth as in Baker, to hold that the gerrymander at issue in that
case was “an illegal method of minimizing the impact of a group of voters’
influence because the new boundaries did not conform to the traditional
districting principles.”201
Importantly with these cases, “[e]ven though the Court established
standards of review for racial gerrymandering, the Court remained silent as
192
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202

to the issue of political gerrymandering.” The Court’s first opportunity
to directly address partisan gerrymandering was in the 1972 case Gaffney
v. Cummings.203 There, the Court upheld the plan, stating that political
considerations always played a part in a redistricting plan, but hinted that
plans which unduly discriminated against certain political groups might be
unconstitutional.204 In 1986, the case of Davis v. Bandemer205 “established
a formal judicial role in partisan gerrymandering disputes” and “suggested
the coming of a second reapportionment revolution,” but “failed to provide
a clear standard to the lower courts when dealing with these issues.”206
A plurality of four Justices argued for a standard that
required plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination against
a political group as well as a discriminatory effect on that
group. Justice White, writing for the plurality, did not
consider the showing of the intent prong a difficult one
because districting involves political considerations.
However, the effects prong required a showing that the group
had been repeatedly denied the opportunity to affect the
political process. This requirement went beyond showing that
the results of an election were not proportional to the relative
strength of the parties. In order to show an unconstitutional
gerrymander, a group of like-minded voters would need to
show an inability to convert their majority numbers into an
electoral victory over a number of election cycles. The
plurality required a showing of discriminatory effect even if
the group had established discriminatory intent.207
Seven Justices found the redistricting plan at issue constitutional, but
used different reasoning.208 Justice White’s plurality opinion was followed
by courts going forward, but even after members of the Court “went so far
as to find that partisan gerrymandering might impose a greater threat to
Equal Protection than electoral districts of unequal population”209 just a
few years prior, “only in Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin did
a court find a constitutional violation using the Bandemer standards.”210
Nearly twenty years after Bandemer, “the Supreme Court, in Vieth v.
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Jubelirer,
faced the issue of partisan gerrymandering and again
attempted to provide proper judicial standards.”212 In a change of course,
“[w]riting for the Court, Justice Scalia determined the claim represented a
political question [lacking judicially manageable standards,] and that the
Supreme Court lacked the ability to decide the matter.”213 One concurring
opinion “agreed with the plurality as to the judgment, but disagreed that all
partisan gerrymandering claims fall within the political question doctrine,”
and “[i]n three dissenting opinions, four Justices argued partisan
gerrymandering was a justiciable issue and proposed possible standards to
evaluate the claims.”214
On top of the difficulty in getting political gerrymandering issues in
front of a court, some scholars believe that the Constitution does not even
provide a judicial remedy for this kind of problem:
Although there is a consensus that gerrymandering may
violate the Constitution, there is a marked disagreement as to
why. To begin with, there is disagreement about which
provisions of the Constitution gerrymanders violate.
Depending upon whom one reads, gerrymandering
supposedly violates the First Amendment, the Guarantee
Clause, the Elections Clause, the Equal Protection Clause. A
few go further, claiming that although gerrymandering
violates no specific clause, it violates the Constitution’s
overall structure. Perhaps just as important, there is
disagreement about the constitutional evils caused by
gerrymandering. Some claim that gerrymanders are
unconstitutional because they dilute votes; others lament that
they generate uncompetitive elections; and still others say
that the evil is that gerrymanders produce extremist
legislators, who are unwilling to compromise. . . . In the case
of gerrymandering, we believe that the dissensus about why
and when gerrymanders are unconstitutional reflects rather
serious shortcomings with the underlying assertion that the
Constitution somehow regulates gerrymandering.215
These scholars base their arguments on the fact that the “Constitution
never sets out criteria for the proper composition of the legislature, the
suitable amount of electoral competitiveness, or the correct ideological
211
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balance of legislators within a legislature.” Further, they state that “[t]he
infinite number of possible ideal districting baselines [to measure others
against] makes it all but impossible to suppose that the Constitution
implicitly singles out one such baseline and mandates it.”217 They dismiss
arguments “that gerrymanders unconstitutionally deny the electorate
competitive election” by saying the arguments “exalt[] a preference for
competitive elections that is constitutionally immaterial;”218 the preference
is simply not there in the text. Most convincingly, they argue that “[t]he
Supreme Court went as far as was plausible into the political thicket when
it discovered the ‘one-person, one-vote’ requirement. Any further, and the
Court indulges the view that the Constitution prohibits whatever outrages
judicial and scholarly sensibilities.”219
Whether or not these scholars can convince courts that the Constitution
does not provide remedies against perceived gerrymandering, Congress is
free to take action at any time.220 “The Constitution gives states the ability
to undermine the people, but names Congress as the protector of the
people’s right to vote for House members.”221 However, as detailed above,
“recent trends show Congress failing in that duty.”222 Continual failures by
Congress to ensure fair and representative elections “recently led Justice
Stevens to conclude that ‘ample evidence demonstrates that many of
today’s congressional representatives owe their allegiance not to “the
People of the several states” but to the mercy of state legislatures,’ which
secure such results through partisan gerrymandering.”223 In this way,
partisan gerrymandering harms federalism. It “diminishes the quality of
representation in the House and makes House election results dependent
upon control of state government. That latter effect both contravenes the
original conception of federalism and diminishes the ability of voters to
choose differing state and federal policies.”224 When federalism is
endangered, there are serious concerns for the government at both the state
and federal level.
To the extent that basic principles of federalism require the
216
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separation of state government from the federal, failure to
maintain separation threatens the legitimacy of the House as
a representative body. The legitimacy of any one state’s
congressional delegation is a national matter because every
state’s citizens will naturally want the federal government to
be legitimate: an unrepresentative delegation could taint the
entire legislative process, and tainted laws affect all
citizens.225
Finally, “[u]nlike reform by Congress, reform by the judiciary has no
inherent legitimacy.”226 If the main complaint about gerrymandering comes
from its diminishing of the perceived legitimacy of elections, and therefore
laws made by the legislature, it makes sense that the legislature should be
the one to restore its own legitimacy in the eyes of voters.
D. Implications for Future Partisan Gerrymandering Cases
The report to Congress by the Comptroller General called for in the
Act could provide a structure for courts to build upon in future partisan
gerrymandering cases. At this time, this argument is speculative, as the Act
is vague as to what the contents of the Comptroller General’s report would
be. However, if the Comptroller General reported that enacting national
standards for congressional redistricting was desirable due to the failings of
past redistrictings across the country, challengers to present or future
partisan gerrymanders could use the report to support their arguments.
Such findings would need to catalogue redistrictings in the past that
harmed an identifiable political party’s chance to effectively influence the
political process over an extended period of time.
Hopefully the Comptroller General’s report would provide some more
compelling empirical data proving the harms that are theorized to be
caused by partisan gerrymanders. Current studies suggest that
gerrymandering is not an important cause of polarization; the Senate has
become just as polarized as the House of Representatives, and Senate
districts are not significantly gerrymandered along partisan lines.227
Additionally, “the evidence is weak that House polarization causes Senate
polarization or that gerrymandering has polarized the House.”228 However,
mathematical projections, as opposed to empirical observations, do support
the idea that gerrymandering distorts voters’ choices in who ultimately gets
225
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elected. Researchers at Duke University
varied the state’s congressional districts to calculate what the
outcome of the 2012 U.S. House of Representatives elections
might have been had the state’s districts been drawn to
emphasize nonpartisan boundaries. The team re-ran the
election 100 times—using the same votes as in 2012 and
tweaking the voting map with only the legal requirements of
a redistricting plan in mind. Not once did they get the split of
Democratic and Republican seats seen in the actual
election.229
The average simulated election elected seven or eight Democrats and
five or six Republicans, a marked difference from the actual outcome of
nine Republicans and four Democrats.230 “During the 2012 elections in
North Carolina, Republicans took nine of the state’s 13 U.S. House seats
although 51 percent of the two-party vote went to Democratic
candidates.”231 The Comptroller General’s report would likely focus on
empirical data, as the focus of the office is to carry out “audit, evaluative,
and investigative assignments and [to provide] legal analyses to the
Congress.”232 Whatever the findings, they would be a welcome addition to
the mixed studies on the true effects of partisan gerrymandering.
The report could also support the feasibility of future partisan
gerrymandering litigation. Though Vieth contained a plurality opinion
dismissing the partisan gerrymandering challenge in that case as a
nonjusticiable political question, it is important to keep in mind that the
holding was not from a majority of the Court.233 Thus, “Vieth did not
resolve the question left open in Bandemer, namely, what are the judicially
manageable standards to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims.”234
Supported by the principle of stare decisis,235 future challengers to
partisan gerrymanders could urge courts to return to Bandemer’s twopronged analysis, relying on the Comptroller General’s report to prove a
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discriminatory effect.
In Vieth the Court stated that the Bandemer
standard had proved unmanageable in application, largely due to the
inability of plaintiffs to prove a discriminatory effect over several
elections.237 As stated above, a plurality of Justices in Bandemer argued for
a standard that required plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination
against a political group as well as a discriminatory effect on that group,
characterized in Vieth as “the Bandemer plurality’s vague test of ‘denied
its chance to effectively influence the political process.’”238 With a report
from the Comptroller General detailing instances in recent history where
partisan gerrymanders have denied a chance at effectively influencing the
political process, challengers could satisfy this prong of the Bandemer test
and redeem it as a manageable standard. If a plaintiff could prove that he
had been a member of an identifiable party and voted for that party over a
long period of time in a gerrymandered district where it was impossible for
his party to elect a candidate due to partisan bias, he might have a claim
strong enough to get past the Court’s concerns in Vieth.
V. THE OPEN OUR DEMOCRACY ACT AS A PACKAGE OF REFORMS
On average less than fifty percent of eligible voters participate in
national elections.239 “Even in a close national race where each vote holds
significantly more practical sway, such as the 2000 Presidential election,
turnout [does] not dramatically increase.”240 By conducting interviews and
surveys, the New York Times found that “Americans do not vote because
they see no reason to vote;” they felt that their votes had lost value both in
influencing the results of elections and in symbolic value as a democratic
virtue.241 Because of this, a worthy goal of any individual election reform
is to reverse this demoralization and increase voter turnout by inspiring the
hope that changes can be and are being made to the electoral process.
Among other things, this low turnout harms perceptions of Congress as
legitimate and representative. Those feelings can further encourage more
eligible voters to abstain from voting. The Committee for the Study of the
American Electorate, a nonpartisan research organization, “found that there
are numerous ancillary societal problems that directly relate to
nonvoting.”242
These problems included “the fact that people who don’t vote tend not
236
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to participate in other forms of political, civic, or social activity.”243 The
Committee went on to further note that
there is an inherent danger to the orderly process of
democracy that results from a lack of participation by most
voters. . . . Voting promotes the civility of the national
dialogue and the habitual use of orderly and lawful processes
to effect change. . . . An apathetic electorate that no longer
participates in the process is a dangerous thing to a stable
democracy. The possibility of unlawful conduct in order to
create change becomes more likely.244
According to one commentator, “[a] logical conclusion is that the lack
of participation in the democratic process itself, not the breakdown of the
American family, is the root of many societal ills. . . . Voting abstention
and the general apathy of the electorate point to a loss of faith in the
democratic system.”245
These are the problems the Act directly seeks to address by
encouraging voter turnout and therefore restoring faith in Congress and the
American system of government. Creating single open primaries has the
potential to incentivize political candidates to appeal to more centrist
voters outside of the extremes of their parties, and to make voters feel like
their voices have a better chance of being heard. This will address the
problem of apathy by forcing politicians to campaign on issues and
positions that are important to a wider group of people than at present. Not
only will they have to appeal to voters across the ideological spectrum
within their own parties, but they will also have to be palatable to
potentially sympathetic voters in opposing parties because of the structure
of the single open primary. This goal will be carried even further by reform
of partisan gerrymandering after the study called for in the Act is
completed. Redrawing of heavily gerrymandered districts will ensure that
there is indeed a mix of party affiliations and ideologies within a given
congressional district for a candidate to have to appeal to, thereby, in
theory, further solidifying an ideological shift to the center. And finally,
making Election Day a national holiday will give these newly involved
voters a dedicated time to go and do their civic duty. Even more so than
weekend voting, it will make voting easier for voters to fit into their
schedule, and more formal recognition of the act of voting will go towards
restoring the image of voting as a civic duty and virtue in a democratic
society as it once was.
Each of these three proposals would be effective in increasing voter
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participation and perceptions of legitimacy in the political process, but all
three together are stronger than any one or two alone. Without an Election
Day holiday, gains made in increasing feelings of inclusion would be
limited by the remaining problem of voters not having time to physically
go to the polls. Without gerrymandering reform, candidates would still be
speaking to voters that are ideologically very similar within their presently
gerrymandered districts, and the moderating effects of the single open
primary would be diminished. Without the change to a single open
primary, one Republican and one Democrat would continue to necessarily
run against each other in the final election, and the moderating effects of
redrawn districts would be limited by the continued incentive to appeal to
the extremes of political parties who are most likely to go out and vote in a
given district.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress has the power to enact these reforms, and a strong interest in
protecting its own legitimacy and the perceived integrity of the electoral
process. On a national level, these reforms should each be desirable to all
eligible voters, and so the Act should have the support of a wide portion of
the electorate. The only obstacle to the passage of these reforms are the
Congressmen themselves. It is too early in the legislative process to know
what the arguments of the opponents of the Act will be, but, somewhat
cynically, it is safe to speculate that the only motivation will be
conservation of the power of individual incumbent Congressmen and their
respective parties. The end goal of the reforms set out in the Act is to
increase voter participation through increased inclusion and by providing
an easy opportunity and heightened incentive to go and cast a vote so that
individual voters start to feel like their voices are heard through elections.
As this Comment has argued, the reforms are capable of having their
intended effects if they are passed by Congress and fully enacted.

